Sino-Indian Relations in the New Millennium: Challenges and Prospects

Given the plural nature of Indian society, diverse images of China are present in the average Indian mind. These images tend to vary from one extreme to the other.

For instance, there is a view that China, having made remarkable and unprecedented economic progress, will become more muscular and assertive in the context of redressing perceived historical wrongs or seeking geopolitical primacy at the cost of India.

At the other extreme there could be the image, or an expectation, that a China that has followed liberal economic policies to achieve rapid economic growth would become a benign force supporting the developing world in reversing the trend towards the dominance of the international system by single powers after the Cold War. Both categories of images are at best vague psycho-cultural generalisations, which mislead, not contribute to rational and autonomous Indian judgements.

Looked from the perspective of India’s experience of relations with China over the last fifty years, I would make a plea that we break out of a historical pattern in which both Chinese and Indians have unilaterally projected either their best hopes or their worst fears upon the complex and mixed realities of both countries. As an Indian I would urge that we do not project in our external relations, particularly with regard to China, a sense of frustration borne out of an Indo-pessimism. A great degree of political maturity and self-confidence is necessary if we eire to face certain challenges that we have inherited in our relationships with China, while moving towards realising the inherent potential in that relationship. It would thus be more productive for India in the pursuit of its national interest to focus on the content of desirable policies to be pursued in various issues-areas vis-A-vis China-rather than using iconic and in some cases potentially infllmmatory labels that some strategists feel would exhaustively describe the nature of Sino-Indian relations. Only such an approach would befit the management of relations between the two oldest civilisational states in Asia, geographical neighbours and the world’s two largest populated complexes. The two countries share more similarities and even internal transitional problems than any other two neighbouring countries, as they learn to cope with globalisation in the new millennium.

A quick look at events this year in Sino-Indian interactions presents a backdrop to the subject. The visit of President Narayanan to China between 28 May to 3 June 2000 can be taken as a point of departure. Coming as it did to commemrrate the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China, the visit was not merely symbllic. It could mark the beginning of fresh perspectives on approaching solutions to old and hardy differences while providing a fresh impetus to the achievement of a constructive, mutually beneficial and cooperative partnership between India and China, which is the proclaimed objective of both sides.

The visit of the president to China was followed by the Chinese foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan, coming to India and there have been other exchanges at ministerial levels. Exchanges at the official and armed forces levels have also been brisk in the current year. The visit of the Chinese foreign minister has put on the agenda of inter-governmental dialogue and actions some of the points raised during the president’s discussions with high-level Chinese leaders.

Among the long-standing challenges to the ingenuity of decision makers in India and China is the one over disputed territory, where each side claims expanses the other either controls or possesses and administers. India is in full administrative and military control over the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims. China is in possession of north-eastern Ladakh (Aksai Chin), which India claims. In the collective subconscious of the people’s of both countries, more particularly amongst political leaders, and the armed forces, the boundary dispute plays a large role, inhibiting the creation of trust and confidence. The elements of trust and confidence are necessary if the two countries are to move from a situation of non-advrrsarial but thinly substantive relations to those where significant vested interests are built up in both countries, which would propel the overall relationship forward.

With the perspective that distance from unpleasant events brings, it should be possible for a more objective look at the past. Neither India nor China can claim to have made cast-iron cases to the territories claimed and shown on their official maps (in the case of India on the official maps released from the mid-fifties). Neither the leaders of India nor of China in the early fifties were completely candid with each other when there was sufficient evidence to show that the borders as depicted on the other’s maps revealed disputes. This was particularly surprising given the bonhomie and mutual support given to each other over a host of international issues of the times. Neither side consulted or informed the other over actions taken by one in the other’s claimed territory, which affected the latter’s interests. The assumptions by the then leaders of the two countries that understanding and cooperation over the wider issues of the emergence of a new Afro-Asian order following the retreat of colonialism, and that each one’s national experience of overcoming centuries of political humiliation would provide the building blocks of Sino-Indian solidarity were belied by events surrounding Tibet and the differences on the boundary question. On the Indian side the nature of our parliamentary democracy led to fractious debates when Chinese communist forces entered Tibet in 1949. Much of the debate hinged on factually erroneous arguments based on the status of Tibet and the ideological aversion to the rise of a big neighbouring country that was led by a communist party. The same spirit of acrimonious debates in the Indian parliament were to continue from 1959 to 1962, when the situation in Tibet deteriorated and when border clashes erupted. On the Chinese side, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, at least from the late fifties, the relationship between China and India was increasingly viewed through the prism of the widening ideological and inter-state disputes between China and the former Soviet Union. The discovery by Indian patrols of the road through Aksai Chin in Ladakh, the expression of the wide differences over the boundary in correspondence between the foreign ministries of India and China and in the letters exchanged between Nehru and Zhou Enlai, the flight of the Dalai Lama and his followers to India, and bloody incidents along the boundary involving the loss of lives cumulatively led in 1959 to a worsening of relations. Unfortunately, the opportunity provided for high-level negotiations to stem the adverse tide in 1960, when Premier Zhou Enlai visited India, W3S not availed by Nehru because of opposition within his cabinet and in parliament.₁

With the efflux of decades from the 1962 armed conflict, a greater measure of pragmatism has marked relations between India and China. The first step in the direction was a gradual shift away from the unproductive Indian stand that negotiations on the boundary could not take place unless Chinese occupation of territory in Ladakh was vacated, or that since borders depicted on Indian maps were well known, having firm basis in earlier historical treaties, there was no need for comprehensive negotiations. This happened when A.B.Vajpayee visited China in 1979 in his former capacity of minister of external affairs. By the eighties the leaders of both governments wisely came to the conclusion that all-round bilateral relations between the two countries should be encouraged, pending the solution of the boundary dispute. The visit of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988 proved to be a landmark in this context and it has set the norms for recent improvement in relations. Successive coalition governments in India have broadly adhered to the understanding reached during that visit.

A status quo whereby India and China are in control and administer areas seen as vital to them in Arunachal Pradesh and in Ladakh respectively has been in place over the last few decades. Neither side has mounted serious armed challenges to the prevalence of this status quo, with a few exceptions as in the mid-eighties over pockets in Arunachal Pradesh. There is a broad agreement between the two governments on the general principles that should govern an eventual boundary agreement. These are that the settlement of the boundary question should be through peaceful and friendly consultations, and that both sides should crcste favourable conditions for a fair and reasonable solution. They are also agreed that the development of relations in all fields would be a contribution to the creation of such favourable conditions. Since force is ruled out in solving the boundary dispute, both sides have repeatedly stressed the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LOAC), which has emerged from 1962, pending an eventual agreement. Last, both sides are agreed that a solution to the boundary question should be acceptable to both. Above all, not a shot has been fired in anger along the boundary for more than two decades.

On the Indian side no attempt has been made by any ruling party or political leader to try and achieve a domsstic inter-party consensus on the possible contours of a boundary settlement with China. There is widespread recognition in intellectual circles in India that there can be no solution without compromises by both sides on their formal positions, nor can there be agree-menits without alienation of territory that each side feels belongs to it. Negotiations further would have to be on the basis of political give-and-take and not based on legal arguments since the dispute cannot be settled in any court of law. In the absence of instructions on the political parameters acceptable to India, so far substantive negotiations for a boundary settlement have not taken place. Given the plural demorratic system in India, any territorial agreement would have to pass the test of detailed public and constitutional scrutiny. The task of attempting to forge a domsstic inter-party consensus has not been undertaken, given the exaggerated perceptions by political parties of the likely electoral impact on their fortunes of compromise solutions. Even in situations where political parties enjoyed large majorities, the task of achieving a domestic consensus on this issue has not been undertaken. Given this situation, talk in India of seeking early solutions to the boundary question is premature unless parliamentary and public opinion are consciously prepared in good time.

If I have referred to the boundary dispute in some detail, it is not because of any immediacy, which I feel should be attached to its final solution, but to emphssise that no attempt has been made in political circles to define the territorial concessions that we need to make to achieve such a solution. Perhaps the same lack of definition also applies to the Indian concept of security in a rapidly changing world.

Fortunately, the maturity that has marked Sino-Indian relations since the exchange of visits by the premiers of both countries and the presidents since 1988 have paved the way for arrangements by which an interim status quo along the LOAC in the three sectors of the boundary can be stabilised to each country’s satisfaction.

The Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, signed in 1993 when Prime Minister Rao visited China, and the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, signed in 1996 when President Jiang Zemin visited India, together commit the two sides to implement a series of measures that would ensure military stability in all sectors of the India-China border. There 3xc some sections where perceptions on where the LOAC runs differ between the two sides. Hence, it is necessary to have a mutually agreed definition of the line in these areas.

Exchange of maps on large scales on each side’s perception of where the LOAC lies using of data based on ne^v scientific surveys from satellite imagery and remote sensing would go a long way in helping mutual agreement on the line. A realistic rather than exaggerated perspectives on pockets vital to each side’s defence should inform negotiations on this matter. Since both agreements clearly lay down that the implementation is without prejudice to the position of each side on the boundary dispute, a constructive and imaginative interpretation of all the provisions in the two agreements would greatly contribute to the formal military stabilisation of the situation along the border areas. The recent exchange of maps on the Middle Sector, where the mutual perception is that it is the area of least dispute on the LOAC, is a good beginning. One does see reports in Indian newspapers of Chinese movements and strengthening of logistic capacities along the boundary. To a certain extent such actions can be anticipated prior to the process of serious negotiations on the LOAC, which have apparently begun. However these would be more worrying if they take place in those areas where there are no differences between the two sides on the LOAC. Early agreement on the Middle Sector would lead to the build-up of trust and confidence in each other with respect to the other two sectors. The end product of agreements in all sectors of the LOAC would have a beneficial spin-off in political terms on the conduct of the overall relationship and the build-up of trust and confidence in intentions with those sectors of strategic establishments, where this is most needed.

It is a very welcome sign that exchanges between the armed forces of both sides have resumed after the pause in 1998-99. Indian naval ships have been received in China, military personnel exchanges at various levels are taking place or are planned. Such exchanges will go a long way in creating the confidence in mutual intentions, understanding of military doctrines, transparency and exchange of technical experience amongst the armed forces, who have lacked direct contact over the decades.

The overall relations between China and Pakistan, and the former’s support for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missile capability are matters of concern to India. This is understandable since in their origin the rationale for the development of these relations was India centred. The conduct of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 gave an extra difficult dimension to the triangular relationship.

Chinese spokesmen, both official and nonoffiicial, have in recent times often referred to readjustments in Sino-Pakistan relations subsequent to the end of the Cold War, the dimunition of India’s links with the erstwhile Soviet Union and China’s collaboration with the USA in containing the former Soviet Union. A practical manifestation of this readjustment can be seen in China’s acknowledgement of India’s predominance in South Asia since the late eighties. China’s strong verbal support to the success of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and its evolving attitude to the Kashmir dispute are other signs of this readjustment. In the way things have developed with the Talibanisation of Afghanistan and its spread to Pakistan, the Chinese face a complex situation that has an impact on China’s sensitive western region of Xinjiang, which has borders with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Afghanistan. Chinese interests would thus need to take into account a variety of factors in maintaining an overall balance in the conduct of relations with both Pakistan and India.

China would not like to see a situation of permanent armed hostility between India and Pakistan, worse still actual conflicts such as the one over Kargil, where it is called upon to take sides. An internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute affects China and promotes, as it fears, Western and particularly American intervention on its periphery. (Its experience as a Permanent Member of the Security Council over Iraq and Kosovo has left it very uncomfortable). The events in Kargil further showed a big accretion of American pressure on Pakistan, which is bound to continue in the light of the nuclearisation of the subcontinent. China is also acutely of the threats posed to the Muslim majority in Xinjiang Province by the spread of armed terrorism, narcotics and religious fundamentalism to the sensitive social and political fabric there. Its serious concern with such problems is manifested by the successive declarations on cooperation to prevent terrorism and fundamentalist militancy between China, Russia and some Central Asian states. These have been followed up by a series of meetings between the security, military and diplomatic experts of these countries. There are obviously shared concerns between India and China in this regard. China’s support to the Indian proposal to move the United Nations for a Resolution on Terrorism, a subject raised by the president of India during his visit to China, is a pointer in this direction.

In the light of the above factors, China’s present position on the Kashmir dispute has imperceptibly moved closer to the position adopted by the major powers. China sees it as a dispute ’left over by history’, which cannot be resolved by quick-fix solutions. The Chinese view is that only India and Pakistan can settle it through bilateral dialogue peacefully and not through the use of force. Pending the solution of the dispute, China advises India and Pakistan to respect the Line of Control. To leave differences aside and to seek mutually beneficial relations in all fields was advice given openly in the Pakistan Senate by President Jiang Zemin in 1996 and repeated on subsequent occasions.

China’s assistance to Pakistan to develop capabilities in the nuclear and missile fields in addition to its being the biggest supplier in conventional military armaments would continue to detract from the build-up of trust in Chinese intentions vis-A-vis India. Chinese statements on helping Pakistan in the non-conventional fields have been ambivalent and of a generalised nature. In an interview to ’The Hindu’ on 22 July 2000 Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, when asked whether China would reconsider support to Pakistan in the non-conventional areas, replied, ’China and Pakistan enjoy normal relations between sovereign countries including relations of military trade, which conform to international law and norms. Their relations are just like the relations India enjoys with some other countries.’ The reference to ’international law and norms’ is to China’s adherence to the Non Proliferation Treaty from 1992 and very recently to the Msssile Control Regimes.

In the only Joint Statement issued by China and the USA on South Asia, when President Clinton visited China in June 1998, a month after the two sets of nuclear tests, both called upon India and Pakistan not to develop and deploy further nuclear weapons, and to put a cap on producing fissile materials. In addition, both reaffirmed that ’their respective policies are to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons’, and significantly ’to this end, we will strengthen our national export control systems’. Since both the USA and China have, together with the other three Permanent Members of the Security Couniil, taken on the mantle of enforcers of the NPT regime, it becomes incumbent on the two to strictly supervise mutual adherence to the terms of the Joint Statement in the interests of achieving better Indo-USA and India-China relations. The peace, security and stability, which the Chinese say they seek in South Asia, would be jeopardised if China’s assistance to Pakistan is intensified in the non-conventional and conventional military fields.

The triangular relationships between India-China-Pakistan is interestingly poised and opportunities have been opened up for the management of this delicate triangle to the benefit of all three. The Chinese need to establish credibility in various Indian circles regarding readjustment in its relations with India’s neighbours has been marked by a realistic restraint and responsibility such as would be appropriate for a great power. Pakistan needs to avail constructively of the trend towards comprehensive dialogue that has been opened up by Indian initiatives on Kashmir and contribute towards the creation of a peaceful environment that would facilitate the dialogue. India needs to press forward with the initiatives without being discouraged by setbacks and must avoid single-issue linkages in the pursuit of a better relationship with China, which is in its best interests. We must seek to absorb in practice that neither is China going to dilute the political relationship with Pakistan for the sake of Sino-Indian friendship nor that all Chinese actions vis-A-vis Pakistan are to the detriment of the conduct of Sino-Indian relations.

Looking beyond the question of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Subcontinent and elsewhere, there is much that is common in Indian and Chinese views on the existence of weapons of mass destruction. In 1996 China put forward proposals at the United Nations calling for drastic reductions of stockpiles on the part of the largest holders of nuclear weapons, ’no first use’ commitment by all states, unconditional commitment of no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, no deployment outside one’s own country and negotiations for complete destruction of nuclear weapons. India could agree with all these propositions. If the moral ground is to be captured by both India and China on questions related to nuclear weapons then they should work together in all international fora to attain these objectives. In addition, India and China are the only two states with nuclear capability to commit themselves to respecting the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South-East Asia promoted by the Association for South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is hoped that the setting up of the security dialogue forum that was agreed to when India’s external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh, visited China in 1999 would take up such issues to build up mutual assurance that the nuclearisation of the subcontinent would not be a factor of added tension in this vastly populated region.

China’s relations with major advanced countries like the USA, those of Western Europe and Japan are stable, although by no means friction free. With the USA the biggest difference is over the future of Taiwan, which refuses to re-unify with the People’s Republic on the latter’s terms, and looks to the USA for political and military support in case China uses force. The Chinese will no doubt follow with great care whether the new president of the USA, George W Bush, will follow up on his very affirmative statements on China and Taiwan made during the run-up to the election. It is not a coincidence that the White Paper on defence issued by China in 2000 bears a strong contrast to the one issued in 1999 where adverse references to the USA outnumber the friendly ones. The difference could be explained primarily by the Taiwan, NMD, TMD and trade factors. American plans for a National Missile Defence system and the possible deployment of a Theatre Missile Defence system in the Pacific has drawn forth very strong responses from China (and from Russia), since the implementation of such plans would nullify China’s capabilities. President Clinton’s move to leave final decisions in the matter to his successor has been welcomed by China. But whether the issue would be revived once again as a very contentious one now remains to be seen. Its specific implication for our region needs to be carefully evaluated. Human rights, trade, the situation in Tibet and proliferation are other issues that the USA has on its agenda vis-A-vis China. Speaking in general terms, there is a complex mix of conflicting policy approaches in both China and the USA in the conduct of mutual relations. From the USA’s point of view the adjustment to the diffusion of power, which the rise of China implies for the USA’s global interests, is yet to be worked out. Wiile the USA’s primacy is keenly felt, its power to fashion a world order in its image is diminishing. From China’s point of view the USA’s unilateralist approaches or attempts at shaping multilateral institutions that affect China’s nationalist aspirations have to be balanced by its overwhelming interest in beneficial trade, investment and economic relations with the USA. Indeed, the challenge to the entire international community is how to evolve multilateral norms and arrangements or develop institutions that would better manage international relations in the very complex ’deregulated’ post-Cold War era. In addressing this challenge, Sino-USA relations play a very crucial role with potential implications for all.

With Russia a ’strategic partnership’ with China has emerged whose main concern is directed at containing the USA’s global reach. Arms transfers, trade in capital goods and raw materials, a flourishing border trade, and cooperation in energy, space and high-tech areas form the substantive parts of a relationship marked by warmth and frequent exchanges at all levels of government and experts. With Japan, China’s relationship is full of economic content and differences, and deep reservations of a political and strategic nature, such as Japan’s possible role in the defence guidelines of the US-Japan Security Treaty. China’s military and economic growth that cause concerns to its neighbours in South-East Asia are mediated through frequent dialogues with the ASEAN as a group. Attempts by ASEAN and China to evolve a code of conduct over the various rival claims in the South China Seas reflect an interest to deal with this complex issue peacefully. Amllioration of tensions in the Korean Peninsula through the summit-level dialogue between North and South Korea has been strongly encouraged by China. All in all, China has never before enjoyed as much security as it has done during the last decade and is well poised on the international stage. India’s own relations with major powers and with South-East, South and East Asian countries have prospered when India and China 3X6 not seen as adversaries.

It is with this China that India has to learn to deal with. Instead of seeking exclusivist alliances with any major power, India must strive for a substantive expansion of bilateral cooperation simultaneously with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Tokyo and the capitals of the countries comprising the European Union. There global issues that cross frontiers and India needs to build issue-based coalitions with major powers to advance its interests. There would be many issues on which India and China could agree. Both see globalisation as an inevitable process with the internationalisation of capital, technologies, investment and trade. But both would like to adapt globalisation to suit their respective national conditions. China has been more welcoming about its memeership in the World Trade Organisation than India, based on the self-confidence of a growing economy. Indeed, China is using the prospect of the WTO at home to restructure loss-making state-owned enterprises, reform financial institutions, gear up industry to face global compttition and open up sectors of economic activity that have been state monopolies. India has conducted successful negotiations with China on the conduct of bilateral trade after China’s entry to the WTO and has gained the promise of lowered tariffs and success to Chinese markets for Indian products. When fact and fiction are separated over the recent controversy on Chinese products ’invading’ Indian markets, it should be possible to strike a balance. The Chinese need to be sensitised through reasoned dialogue at business and government levels to the regulatory frameworks under WTO regulations and Indian small industries enabled to become competitive in a world where the consumer is the master of market forces. Both India and China are energy deficient and need a stable international order and affordable energy imports. Both need to cooperate more closely on lowering the costs of non-conventional forms of energy. In the process of development both have not shown enough awareness of the fragility of the environment and the depletion of natural resources. The agenda for cooperation as the world’s two most populated countries and as ancient civilisational states is truly vast.

It is, however, a fact that unlike in the case of China and its partners in the USA, West Europe, Japan, South-East Asia and Russia, where vested interests have been built up on both sides in the pursuit of dense bilateral relations, the India-China relationship is weak or deficient in the existence of similar vested interests. Bilateral trade between India and China may touch the US$ 2.5 billion mark in 2000 compared to US$ 1.9 in 1999, but this is still far below the potential as the rapid annual growth from the early nineties shows. It is a good sign that the pattern of trade shows an increasing exchange of machinery such as power plant and petrochemical plant equipment from China to India. In the reverse direction pharmaceuticals and agricultural commodities show a rise in India’s export basket.

The field of mutual investments is yet to take off in any significant manner. Indian investments in China are in the fields of pharmaceuticals, refractories and software. Chinese investments in India, which are more significant, are in the field of metallurgy and electronics. With the expansion of global Indian software exports and of auto componntts, the scope in China for Indian companies is wide. Intense exploration followed by exchanges of business delegations are called for and the growing field of information technologies offers opportunities for mutual investments on a large scale.

An initiative at the academic level to promote overland connectivity, trade and cultural interactions as part of an effort to bring about subregional cooperation between China, Myanmrr, Bangladesh and India provides an interesting item on the future agenda of Sino-Indian cooperation. In the second round of the academic dialogue on this subject, which was held in Delhi recently, there was a frank exchange on the possibilities as well as problems underlying the effort. The interesting aspect about the dialogue was the presentations made by the Myanmrrese and Chinese delegations from which one could conclude that both seek closer regional economic integration and that Chinese cooperation surrounding Myanmar and Bangladesh should be inclusive not exclusive. Apparent geographical disadvantages, remoteness and isolation from the continental centres of development that parts of this vast region face are sought to be bridged through land links. To that effect all four partners would develop the needed infrastructure, which in turn would promote mutual economic cooperation. With the recent welcome and programmatic improvements in India-Myanmarese relations covering many fields of concern, some of our strategists must give up a mindset that somehow Myanmar is a zone of exclusive Chinese interest.

Some years after the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962 there had been much criticism of Jawaharlal Nehru’s China policy. I would submit that this is only part of the story. With the wisdom of over four decades of hindsight and with the enormous changes the world has seen since the end of the Cold War, a sober view could be that Nehru was the proverbial prophet before his time, whose vision can be better understood today. Ideological militancy, religious fundamentalism and exclusiveness in developing India’s foreign relations had no place in Indian domsstic and foreign policy. Security built not purely on military muscle, but on economic and scientific development and social justice was his belief. He dedicated himself to the possibility of the evolution of an international system that would respect nationalism, pluralism and diversity of all the nations that composed it. The Five Principles that India and China evolved continue to provide the basis for mutually beneficial cooperation among nations.

Relations between India and China are sui generis-they stand on their own. They do not parallel relations that each of them has with others, nor are there applicable precedents or models for their conduct. It is therefore appropriate if India and China work together to bring about a new paradigm for the structuring of a comprehensive security based on their experience in dealing with each other over five decades and taking into account the changed circumstances of the world of the new millennium. The following elements are suggested as components of a structure for comprehensive security:

• Commitment that existing state limits either as de jure borders or as de facto arrangements will not be disturbed by force.
• Commitment to not being a party to military alliances directed against third states and non-use of the territory 01 one state to threaten, inter-fere or take aggressive actions against another.
• The undertaking of mutual responsibility not to exacerbate domsstic problems of neighbouring states, while recognising that such problems need to be solved by peaceful means.
• No first use of nuclear weapon against all states as a first step to universal nuclear disarmament.
• Commitment not to support militarism, terrorism and separatism. Greater transparency and information sharing on military preparedness. Cooperation in the fight against drugs, disease and environmental degradation, and for enhanced relationship in diverse fields such as trade, investments, exchanges in science and technology, and cultural fields.
• Dialogue leading to agreement on comprehensive security framework, including military and non-mllitary factors, that would enhance prospects of stable and beneficial developments in the Sino-Indian relationship in the new millennium.₂

Notes:

1. The domsstic and external circumstances in each country from the fifties to recent times, which impacted on Sino-Indian relations, is dealt with in C.V Ranganathan and VC. Khanna, India and China: The Way Ahead (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2000).
2. For more details of commitments that India and China could make to achieve a framework of comprehensive security, see the two-part article by Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea and V Ranganathan in The Hindu, dated 8 and 9 May 2000.

By: C.V. Ranganathan

Author’s Address: Institute of Chinese Studies, 29 Rajur Road, Delhi 110 054.

(Source: China Report 2001; 37; 129)

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